February 25, 2015. 6 See Yates, 733 F.3d at 1061-62 (recounting how Yates’s conviction arose solely because Yates allegedly instructed his crew to throw undersized fish overboard). But that is not so: Although the two provisions significantly overlap, each applies to conduct the other does not. But conversely, §1512(c)(1) sometimes reaches more widely than §1519. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,537 U. S. 371–385 (2003) (focusing on the “product of [two] canons of construction” which was “confirmed” by other interpretative evidence); cf. . One does not falsify the outside casing of a hard drive, but one could falsify or alter data physically recorded on that hard drive. Section 1512(c)(1) also applies more broadly than §1519 in proceedings relating to insurance regulation. During his trial, Yates moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that § 1519’s reference to a “tangible object” must be read in light of the destruction of evidence in the Enron implosion that spurred Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage.13×13. See id. on petition for a writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals . Found insideSee Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting “tangible object” in the phrase “record, document, ... 93. On March 9, 2017, a federal grand jury returned a 19-count Superseding Indictment in this case. Had Congress intended “tangible object” in §1519 to be interpreted so generically as to capture physical objects as dissimilar as documents and fish, Congress would have had no reason to refer specifically to “record” or “document.” The Government’s unbounded reading of “tangible object” would render those words misleading surplusage. [3] So the surplusage canon doesn’t come into play. See supra, at 7, 8–9, 11–12. Id. at 1094 (citation omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. . Title 18 U. S. C. 1519 s list of nouns, list of verbs, and title, when combined, tip the case in favor of Yates. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court construed 18 U.S.C. Undeterred by the outcome of his appeal, Mr. Yates filed five additional suits either in the Tax Court or the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina that focused on various aspects of his tax dispute with the IRS. Id. (b) Familiar interpretive guides aid the construction of tangible object. . But the provision began its life in a separate bill, and the drafters emphasized that Enron was “only a case study exposing the shortcomings in our current laws” relating to both “corporate and criminal” fraud. (Notably, even the concurrence puts no stock in the plurality’s section-number and superfluity claims.) certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit, No. That interpretative principle is relevant here, where the Government urges a reading of §1519 that exposes individuals to 20-year prison sentences for tampering with any physical object that might have evidentiary value in any federal investigation into any offense, no matter whether the investigation is pending or merely contemplated, or whether the offense subject to investigation is criminal or civil. In insisting on its different question, the concurrence neglects the proper function of catchall phrases like “or tangible object.” The reason Congress uses such terms is precisely to reach things that, in the concurrence’s words, “do[ ] not spring to mind”—to my mind, to my neighbor’s, or (most important) to Congress’s. When a court cannot determine what a statute means simply by reading its text, the process of statutory interpretation can become difficult. Would a Congress wishing to make certain that §1519 applies toe-mails add the phrase “tangible object” (as opposed, say, to “electronic communications”)? michael e. sullivan robison, sharp, s ullivan & b rust 71 washington street . Yates v. United States. For life, he will bear the stigma of having a federal felony conviction. But §1519 wouldn’t usually apply in that context because state, not federal, agencies handle most insurance regulation. The District Court denied the acquittal motion. at 1084–85. Justice Kagan also saw no room for the canons of noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, or the rule of lenity; these tools were useful when a statute was ambiguous, but for her § 1519 was crystal clear.51×51. "[2]: 28, The dissenting opinion suggests that the plurality opinion acknowledges that a tangible object is "a discrete thing that possesses physical form. The contemporaneous passage of §1512(c)(1), which was contained in a section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act discrete from the section embracing §1519 and §1520, is also instructive. 107–146, at 14. See ante, at 17–18. The noscitur a sociis canon operates in a similar manner here. 1254(1). Judges may voice their disapproval of laws “in lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta. 13-7451 (S. Ct. Feb. 25, 2015) (slip op.). Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, but not § 1519, were placed alongside statutes that criminalized obstructive acts generally.26×26. The District Court denied Yates’s motion, and a jury found him guilty of violating §1519. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2J1.2, comment., n. 1 (Nov. 2014) (“ ‘Records, documents, or tangible objects’ includes (A) records, documents, or tangible objects that are stored on, or that are, magnetic, optical, digital, other electronic, or other storage mediums or devices; and (B) wire or electronic communications.”). Found insideEME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Kagan ... In amplifying that purported guidance, the concurrence suggests applying the term “tangible object” in keeping with what “a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to record or document,” might answer. B. Yates first visited OB/GYN Associates of Western New York on … So the ordinary meaning of the term “tangible object” in §1519, as noone here disputes, covers fish (including too-small red grouper). A broad interpretation would also risk the lack of fair warning and related kinds of unfairness that led this Court in Aguilar to "exercise" interpretive "restraint." L. Rev. Those words are supposed to ensure—just as “tangible object” is meant to—that §1519 covers the whole world of evidence-tampering, in all its prodigious variety. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 31, 52, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. Nos. At many points in oral argument, the Justices faulted the lack of prosecutorial discretion shown in this and other cases the Court has seen in recent years. 2, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. . at 1083–84. Agreeing with the plurality opinion, he wrote that the nouns “record” and “document,” through the aid of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, help to diminish the scope of “tangible object.”39×39. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE … 13-7451). True, the 1962 MPC provision prohibited tampering with any kind of physical evidence. Bank v. Germain,503 U. S. 249,253 (1992). 3/18/2015 Yates v. United States: The Supreme Court Lets Florida Fisherman Off the Hook for SarbanesOxley Charge | Golden Gate University Law Review Online We note first §1519’s caption: “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.” That heading conveys no suggestion that the section prohibits spoliation of any and all physical evidence, however remote from records. John Yates, a commercial fisherman, caught undersized red grouper in federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. The plurality, seizing on the §1514 example, says it likewise “would have made more sense for Congress to codify the substance of §1519 within §1512 or in a new §1512A.”, The plurality’s objection to this statement is difficult to understand. 116 (quoting United States v. Hunt, 526 F. 3d 739, 744 (CA11 2008)). But this does not mean that categories are not useful or that Congress does not enact them. at 2–4. Although the Miss Katie was far enough from the Florida coast to be in exclusively federal waters, she was nevertheless within Officer Jones’s jurisdiction. Id. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 720 (10th ed. That contemporaneous omission also suggests that Congress intended “tangible object” in §1519 to have a narrower scope than “other object” in §1512(c)(1).[7]. Id. Section 1512(c)(1) provides: “(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding, “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”, The legislative history reveals that §1512(c)(1) was drafted and proposed after §1519. Still and all, I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that §1519 is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. Papaya next argues that “undue burden” cannot be resource-specific because resources spent on compliance are “always reimbursed.” JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES. Found insideWilson; United States v. . . . . 157; 233; 363 Winship, In re . . . . 229; 413 Woods; United States v. . . . . 382 Wrenn v. ... 495 Yates v. Evatt . See, e.g., United States v. Kellington, 217 F. 3d 1084, 1088 (CA9 2000) (boat); United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F. 3d 679, 688 (CA3 1999) (stone wall). While “perhaps none of these features by itself would tip the case in favor of Yates, the three combined” did.42×42. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1086–87 (plurality opinion). . Professor David Shapiro has argued that “a great deal is lost in the process of debate if the reasons given by the judge to the public are inconsistent with those he would give in private, or to himself.” David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. Appropriations Act, 2016 (2015 Act), Pub. By a 5-4 vote, the Court proved us wrong when we predicted the conviction would be upheld. Rather, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,519 U. S. 337,341 (1997). She took these headings to indicate that Congress did not intend for “tangible object” to “sweep within its reach physical objects of every kind,” and she demanded a clearer statement from Congress if it did intend for the statute to function as “an all-encompassing ban on the spoliation of evidence.”24×24. But it could have gotten to this result in a better way. the Supreme Court threw out Yates’s conviction, holding that the phrase “tangible object,” for purposes of § 1519, encompasses only objects “used to record or preserve information.” 5× 5. Applying these tenets—and noting, as was the case in Sager, that the provisions are at 1100. For purposes of §1519, records, documents, and (all) tangible objects are therefore alike. The Supreme Court reversed. [?]”). 114-113, sec. Scholars have detailed the metastasis of American criminal law at length. Violation of those regulations is a civil offense punishable by a fine or fishing license suspension. Justice Ginsburg, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor, concluded that a tangible object within 1519 s compass is one used to record or preserve information. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. sec. Section 1519 is very broad. v. United States ex rel. The answer in most cases is obviously “yes.” But in Yates v. United States,1 one of the stranger cases of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court Plaintiff was charged with an excessive noise violation, no license in possession, and disorderly conduct, all of which were nol prossed. 4, 12 (2008) (discussing how dissenting justices “can spark a kind of deliberation that is not the same as partisan politics, but is rooted in the deeply democratic practices of constitutional governmental institutions”). However, the trial judge applied binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, which read the provision broadly, and denied the motion.15×15. Justice Ginsburg then argued that § 1519’s placement in a portion of the U.S. Code narrowly aimed at obstructive acts in financial contexts hinted at its limited scope.25×25. Yates contended Section 1519 was inapplicable because it was “a The Court relied on the toolkit of statutory interpretation; it should have focused instead on the constitutional concerns raised by a broad reading of the statute. A jury convicted Yates on both counts. (invoking “a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible”). Kagan's view is that under the "ordinary meaning of the term," a tangible object in §1519 covers fish (including undersized red grouper). First, in Skilling v. United States,74×74. Ante, at 14. ... On January 30, 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 168-month prison sentence imposed against Martin Kimber for his possession and use of a chemical weapon United States, 574 U.S. ____ (2015) Just a brief comment on the recent Supreme Court of the United States decision in Yates v. United States. Here, focusing on the verbs, the category of nouns appears to be filekeeping. That interpretation accords with endless uses of the term in statute and rule books as construed by courts. The court also determined that because the statute was clear, the rule of lenity did not apply.19×19. For example, courts have understood the phrases “tangible objects” and “tangible things” in the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure to cover everything from guns to drugs to machinery to . JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit. NO. It is highly improbable that Congress would have buried a general spoliation statute covering objects of any and every kind in a provision targeting fraud in financial record-keeping.”). at 1080–81 (plurality opinion). Notice is not the only constitutional norm at issue in Yates. Even if traditional tools of statutory construction leave any doubt about the meaning of the term, it would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. § 1519 — falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record or document—cabin the contextual meaning of that term. [*] *299 Ben Margolis argued the cause for petitioners in No. While conducting an offshore inspection of a commercial fishing vessel in the … 2, 11 (2002). YATES . 107-146, at 7 (2002)).). No. The section applies to anyone who “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the requisite obstructive intent. Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement – February 25, 2015 in Yates v. United States. Scalia, supra, at xi–xvi (listing more than 50 interpretive principles and canons without mentioning the plurality’s new number-in-the-Code theory). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the text of §1519 “plain.” 733 F. 3d 1059, 1064 (2013). Overtly identifying the constitutional problem at issue could also enhance judicial legitimacy.81×81. In early 2015, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Yates v. United States . And the adjacent laundry list of verbs in §1519 (“alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry”) further shows that Congress wrote a statute with a wide scope. Opinion (Ginsburg), Concurrence (Alito), Dissent (Kagan). That language, which itself likely derived from the Model Penal Code, encompasses no less the bloody knife than the incriminating letter, as all courts have for decades agreed. But if 1519 s reference to tangible object already included all physical objects, as the Government also contends, then Congress had no reason to enact 1512(c)(1). We have several times affirmed that identical language may convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute. The Due Process Clause requires the government to provide notice that one’s conduct might be illegal, and the Court employs several doctrines to help police this requirement.59×59. . Yates was also charged with making a false statement to federal law enforcement officers, in violation of18 U. S. C. §1001(a)(2). And so the concurrence ends up right where the plurality does, except that the concurrence, eschewing the rule of lenity, has nothing to fallback on. A concern rooted in proportionality can also be seen in the plurality’s focus on the disconnect between Yates’s potentially severe sentence and his relatively innocuous conduct. See MPC §241.7, Comment 3, at 179 (1980) (provision “applies to any physical object”). Wilson,559 U. S. 280,289, n.7 (2010); Ali, 552 U. S., at 224–226. After the Supreme Court held in Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the “residual clause” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and made that decision retroactive, Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), Yates filed this collateral attack. Justice Ginsburg thus adopted the narrow reading of “tangible object,” interpreting it to reach only objects similar to those at the heart of the Enron debacle that spurred the statute’s passage — those used to “record or preserve information.”37×37. RESPONDENT:United States. As Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Yates would have had scant reason to anticipate a felony prosecution,”67×67. . They do not get better in the combining. To prevent federal authorities from confirming that he had harvested undersized fish, Yates ordered a crew member to toss the suspect catch into the sea. See, e.g., Washington State Dept. Three features of18 U. S. C. §1519 stand out to me: the statute’s list of nouns, its list of verbs, and its title. “Resolution of the pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress.” Rodgers, 466 U. S., at 484. . And Sarbanes-Oxley’s legislative history “puts extra icing on a cake already frosted,”47×47. (Nov. 2003) (reading “records, documents, or tangible objects” to “includ[e]” what is found on “magnetic, optical, digital, other electronic,or other storage mediums or devices”). Found inside – Page 151United States (1951), 351 U.S. 494) and of Harlan J. who has ... of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that end': Yates v. Do you deny that this statute, as you read it, is capable of being applied to really trivial matters, and yet each of those would carry a potential penalty of 20 years . Justice Ginsburg also consulted the relatively specific heading of 18 U.S.C. With few exceptions, the measured fish were between 19 and 20 inches; three were less than 19 inches; none were less than 18.75 inches. That is standard operating procedure. The concurrence takes that expression literally. . And there is a risk that “tangible object” may be made superfluous—what is similar to a “record” or “document” but yet is not one? I know of no other case in which we have begun our interpretation of a statute with the title, or relied on a title to override the law’s clear terms. A proposed federal offense in line with the MPC provision, advanced by a federal commission in 1971, was similarly qualified. Found inside – Page 123In the case of Yates v. United States (2015), the Supreme Court considered whether federal prosecutors overreached in prosecuting a commercial fisherman ... Now as to this statute, I think the plurality somewhat—though only somewhat—exaggerates the matter. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. ___, ___. 116. . • Yates v. United States, No. Argued November 5, 2014 Decided February 25, 2015. 2:10–cr–66–FtM–29SPC (MD Fla., Aug. 8, 2011), App. Yates was convicted of destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation under 18 U. S. C. 519, which applies when a person “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. United States, 2015) John Yates argued that tangible objects according to §1519 are not fish because its origin comes from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which is a law designed for the financial sector and that the statute was passed to cover files and electronic records and not tangible objects such as fish . See ante, at 14–15; ante, at 2–3 (opinion of Alito, J.). . Argued November 5, 2014—Decided February 25, 2015 . 24, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/a-fish-story-106010.html [http://perma.cc/MWC6-QYF2], Yates might be hard-pressed to argue that he had no notice that his conduct was unlawful. Dist. Lenity offers no proper refuge from that straightforward (even though capacious) construction.[6]. When Congress has not supplied a definition, we generally give a statutory term its ordinary meaning. , are often underinclusive or overinclusive—§1519, for instance, this Court has. Illuminate Congress ’ s usage accords with the word “ any. ” )... 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